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Is memory purely preservative?* 
Jérôme Dokic 
(University of Rouen and CREA, Paris) 
In C. Hoerl & T. McCormack (eds), Time and Memory, Oxford: OUP. 
 
§1 Two forms of memory and Goethe’s Problem 
 
 Let us start with a familiar distinction between two forms of memory: episodic 
memory (remembering a thing or an episode) vs. factual memory (remembering that 
something is the case).1 
 Factual memory does not necessarily give rise to the corresponding episodic 
memories. For instance, we colloquially use formulations such as the following: 
  
(1) I remember (I know) that I broke my leg when I was a child, yet I don’t 
remember the incident itself. 
 
 I remember that the incident was painful, but I do not remember the pain. I know that I 
broke my leg, because I learnt it from my parents, but I have forgotten (in the relevant, 
episodic sense) the painful experience itself. In general, factual memory that p does not imply 
episodic memory of x, where x is an objective constituent of the proposition that p. 
 Many things which I know about myself and my own past life I learnt from others. 
This is especially true of events in my early childhood. A central question in the philosophy of 
memory is how we should explain the distinction between those of my autobiographical 
memories (i.e. the memories whose expression requires use of the first-person “I”) which are 
genuinely episodic and those which belong to personal folklore – to things that friends and 
family members told me at various times after the remembered events. 
 One suggestion is that the relevant difference between episodic and factual memory 
has to do with the memory’s causal history (rather than with its content). Arguably, any 
memory – episodic or not – which refers to a particular past experience causally derives from 
                                                                 
* I would like to thank the Editors, Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack, for their very valuable comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Various versions of this distinction can be found, inter alia, in Russell (1921), Bergson (1939), Ayer (1956), 
and Malcolm (1963). In what follows, I freely oscillate between saying that a subject remembers an incident and 
saying that a subject remembers experiencing the incident. As we shall see, the latter description is more 
perspicuous than the former as far as episodic memory is concerned. 
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that experience itself. (This is a consequence of the causal theory of singular thought.) But 
there are memories which come directly from the subject’s past experience, in the sense that 
neither external testimony (verbal or not) nor internal reasoning are essential links in the 
causal chain connecting past and present. For instance, my memory that I broke my leg when 
I was 3 does not come directly from the past incident, since it causally depends on my 
parents’ testimony. My present memory (or knowledge) that the incident was painful does not 
come directly from the incident either, since I inferred this some time ago, from the parental 
narration. 
 I suppose that there is an intuitive notion of “coming directly” from the remembered 
experience, even if a more precise definition is certainly needed. We can provisionally content 
ourselves with the following negative definition: a memory comes directly from the 
remembered experience only if the memory’s causal history does not essentially involve 
testimony or inference. 
 The envisaged suggestion, then, is that a given memory is episodic if and only if it 
comes directly from the remembered event – otherwise it is factual. Is this suggestion 
plausible? 
 Unfortunately, it is not. To see why, it is worth considering a remark made by Goethe 
at the beginning of his autobiographical work, Poetry and Truth: 
 
When we wish to remember what happened to us in the early times of childhood, it is 
often the case that we confuse what we heard from others with what we genuinely 
know from our own experience.2 
 
 On one way of reading this passage, episodic memory is not intrinsically associated 
with a specific experience or feeling. We have to reject the idea of a “phenomenology of 
episodic memory”, that is the myth of a memory experience immediately recognizable by its 
phenomenal properties.3 This reading is compatible with the envisaged suggestion. Episodic 
memories are those that come directly from the remembered event, but we often confuse 
episodic memories with factual ones, if only because (it is assumed) memory does not wear 
its causal history on its sleeves. 
 However, there is another interpretation of Goethe’s remark, which I think brings it 
closer to the true nature of episodic memory. The memories alluded to by Goethe in this 
                                                                 
2 (1811: translated from p. 15). My attention to this passage was drawn by Anscombe (1974). 
3 This is Anscombe’s reading. 
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passage are precisely not episodic. An episodic memory normally appears to the subject as 
coming directly from his own past experience, in a way which excludes the alternative 
possibility that it is immediately grounded on testimony or reasoning. Episodic memory 
normally reveals its own immediate origin. In general, I do not confuse an episodic memory 
with a factual memory deriving from external testimony. Of course, a seemingly episodic 
memory might not trace directly back to the relevant past experience, and I might wonder, at a 
reflective level, whether this is so with a particular memory of mine.4 However, if good 
reasons convince me that this is indeed so, I have to admit that I was somewhat deluded. Even 
if I can recover veridical pieces of f actual information from my memory, there was something 
wrong about it, in so far as it presented itself as episodic. 
On the proposed reading of Goethe’s passage, a factual memory does not become 
episodic just because it happens to come directly from the remembered event. The following 
description is not self-contradictory: 
 
(2) I remember (I know) that I broke my leg. For all I know, my memory might 
come directly from the past incident, yet I don’t remember the incident itself. 
 
 Goethe’s point is that factual memory does not reveal its own immediate origin. So I 
may presently possess the information that I broke my leg when I was a child, while I have 
forgotten how I acquired this piece of information. I cannot just read off the causal history of 
my factual memory from that memory itself (or from its content). Therefore, although coming 
directly from the remembered event is a necessary condition of episodic memory, it is 
certainly not a sufficient condition, since it can also be satisfied by merely factual m emories. 
  Further reflection on Goethe’s remark shows that other claims about episodic memory 
cannot be sustained. For instance, one might suggest that a given memory is episodic if and 
only if (i) it comes directly from the relevant past incident, and (ii) the subject remembers that 
it comes directly from this incident. In other words, an episodic memory is defined as a 
factual memory which comes directly from the remembered experience, and which is the 
object of a further meta-memory about its immediate origin. (It is a meta-memory in the sense 
that it is a memory about another memory.) However, this account of episodic memory does 
not work. Suppose that I spontaneously tell my parents a story about a past incident, without 
knowing whether the story comes directly from my own experience, or from external 
testimony. My parents declare that the story must come from me, since (they say) there is no 
                                                                 
4 I do not want to exclude the possibility that Goethe was also thinking of such a case. 
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way I could have learnt this from someone else. I acquire thus the further, factual meta-
memory that my memory ( or the set of memories constituting my story) comes directly from 
my own experience. These memories do not necessarily amount to episodic memory of the 
relevant incident. The following description may be perfectly accurate: 
 
(3) I remember (I know) that I broke my leg, I also remember (I know) that the 
first memory comes directly from my past experience, yet I don’t remember 
the incident itself. 
 
 This description will be appropriate in a context in which I have forgotten the 
immediate origin of my meta-memory (for instance, that it comes directly from my parents). 
Obviously, insisting that I remember that the second-order memory comes directly from my 
own experience leads us nowhere, because this would simply raise the corresponding question 
about the causal history of the third-order memory. Episodic memory does not seem to be 
(easily) definable in terms of a structured set of factual memories, even if some of them are 
meta-representational. 
 In general, the possibility that a factual memory comes directly from the remembered 
experience and the possibility that it does not are equally compatible with the memory’s being 
veridical or correct, even warranted. In contrast, the possibility that a seemingly episodic 
memory does not come directly from the past experience is not compatible with its 
correctness. It follows that the epistemic value of episodic memory is different from the 
epistemic value of factual memory. Factual memory gives the subject a reason to believe that 
the remembered event really happened, and is not the result of fiction or imagination. 
However, genuine episodic memory gives the subject something more: it provides him or her 
with a reason to believe that the information carried by it does not essentially derive from 
testimony or inference but comes directly from the subject's own past life.5 
 I shall call “Goethe’s Problem” the philosophical problem of accounting for this 
epistemic gulf between episodic and factual memory. An important task of a theory of 
                                                                 
5 This way of formulating the epistemological difference between episodic and factual memory is all right as far 
as it goes, but in the light of the main conception presented in this  chapter, it does not go far enough. For there is 
another crucial difference between the two forms of memory. Consider a particular factual memory which 
involves information originally acquired by perception. If the relevant piece of information has been properly 
retained and faithfully preserved, but is in fact wrong (and so is a piece of misinformation), all the blame goes to 
the perceptual experience which introduced the information into the cognitive scene. In contrast, episodic 
memory is a sui generis experience, and as such it is always, so to speak, epistemically responsible for the 
veridicality of the carried information. Thus, if a seemingly episodic memory carries what is in fact 
misinformation, there is something wrong with the memory itself (it is at least partly illusory), and not (or not 
only) with the relevant past experience. 
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episodic memory is to solve Goethe’s Problem, in showing how that form of memory can 
have the substantial epistemic role it appears to have. 
 
§2 Factual memory is purely preservative 
 
 What emerges from these preliminary considerations is that factual memory does not 
have to carry information about its own causal history. Arguably, this is a consequence of the 
fact that it is purely preservative: The piece of information the subject is said to remember 
must have been originally acquired by other cognitive means (e.g. perception or testimony), 
retained and faithfully preserved since then. Since most, if not all pieces of information 
acquired by perception or testimony do not say anything about how they have been acquired, 
the same is true of information retained and preserved by factual memory. 
 In this section, I shall make a little more precise the claim that factual knowledge is 
purely preservative. Although I shall ultimately argue that there is a connection between 
memories being purely preservative and them not being episodic, I do not want to exclude at 
the outset the possibility that episodic memory is purely preservative (and even is a kind of 
factual memory). 
 Let us start with a reasonably straightforward case. I see that there is a book on the 
table in front of me, and I acquire the corresponding perceptual knowledge. Later, having left 
the room, I remember that there was a book on the table then in front of me. I have factual 
memory knowledge about the book. Obviously, in this case, memory is not a source of 
knowledge, since the remembered piece of knowledge has been acquired by cognitive means 
other than memory, namely visual perception and judgement. As Dummett puts it, “I cannot 
separate the knowledge I suppose myself to have now from the knowledge I surely had at the 
past time. For the former is derived from the latter; more exactly, it simply is the knowledge I 
had as an eyewitness, maintained in being” (1993: 414-15). If memory were a source of 
knowledge in this case, we would have to say that each time I remember that there was a book 
on the table, I re-acquire the same piece of knowledge over and again. This seems absurd.6 
 Sometimes, of course, what is preserved from the original acquisition of information 
to the present memory need not be knowledge, even if the present memory itself is 
knowledge. Suppose that I did not believe that there was a book on the table when I saw it, 
because I (wrongly) thought that I was faced with, say, a hologram. I saw that there is a book 
                                                                 
6 Cf. Shoemaker (1967: 272). Factual memory can be a source of knowledge in a different sense, since it is 
always possible to draw knowledge-preserving inferences from it. 
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on the table, but I did not know it (because I did not even believe it). Later, becoming aware 
of my mistake, I believe that there was a book on the table after all. Intuitively, my present 
belief is a case of factual memory knowledge, in so far as it carries well-grounded or 
warranted information faithfully preserved over time.7 My memory is still purely preservative, 
since its content is information originally acquired by perception. I remember, and know that 
there was a book on the table partly because such was the content of my original perception. 
 A first claim about factual memory, then, is that it involves a continuous information-
link between the original cognitive state (e.g. visual perception) and the present memory. (I 
ignore the possibility of innate knowledge and information.) Part of the explanation of why 
my factual memory is knowledge is that I successfully preserved a single informational state 
originally capable of grounding knowledge. There should not be any (substantial) interruption 
in the informational chain. If I have lost track of the relevant information, I have lost track of 
the memory, and the matter is forgotten (although I might have later another factual memory 
with the same content). Of course, we might be temporarily unable to retrieve information we 
in fact possess, as when I have someone’s name on the tip of my tongue. This is, so to speak, 
a performance and not a competence problem. There is a distinction to be drawn between 
possessing a piece of information we cannot access because of independent and momentary 
interference, and having completely forgotten the information. Interruption in the 
informational chain has the latter as a consequence. 
 A second claim I think we should make about factual memory is that the information-
link underlying factual memory is doxastic: It is always by means of some belief that 
information carried by factual memory is preserved over time. One motivation for this claim 
is the following. A central and much-discussed feature of factual memory is that it allows us 
to retain a propositional content without keeping track of the specific reasons for which the 
content has been originally formed. How is it possible, then, that a present factual memory 
amounts to knowledge? It cannot be knowledge if it is carrying a piece of information which 
was merely entertained by the subject outside any belief context. What epistemic value would 
we attach to a piece of information which is retained as a merely entertained piece of 
information (if indeed this makes sense at all), as opposed to something which is actually 
believed by the subject? For all the subject knows, this information might have been once 
                                                                 
7 The fact that information acquired by perception has been retained and preserved over time is among the 
“ground-floor” conditions on memory knowledge, in the sense defined by Campbell (1994: 234). There are 
other, “reflective” conditions on memory knowledge, though. The mere fact that warranted information has been 
retained and preserved is not sufficient for knowledge. What I have to say here about factual memory is 
compatible with what Peacocke (1986: 161) calls “The Model of Virtual Inference”. 
 7
entertained in the context of fancy or imagination. (Remember that one can have a factual 
memory while having forgotten the circumstances in which the remembered information has 
been acquired.) 
A partial solution to this problem has already been suggested by Dummett: sometimes, 
the present memory is identical with a belief that was properly grounded on the relevant past 
experience. In the first case described above, there is a single belief, to the effect that there is 
(or was) a book on the table, which is preserved over time as a single piece of knowledge. The 
case in which I do not believe that there is a book on the table when I see one is more 
complicated. Here, the formation of the belief that there was a book on the table does not 
coincide with the acquisition of the corresponding information. This does not contradict the 
second claim. The information-link between past and present is still doxastic since it is 
crucially relayed by the meta-representational belief that I have (or had) a visual experience 
with a definite character and content. When I realized that I was wrong, and that my past 
experience was veridical after all, I detached the belief that there was a book o n the table from 
this meta-representational belief.8 
 Combining the two claims together, we can say that factual memory involves a 
continuous information-link which is guaranteed, at any time between the past acquisition of 
the information and the present memory, by some belief carrying the relevant information. 
Either the present factual memory is the very belief that was grounded on the original 
cognitive state, or it is a belief which has been validly derived from a set of beliefs which 
contained the information, until a point has been reached at which a belief is immediately 
grounded on the original cognitive state. (This is only a rough formulation.) In either case, the 
memory’s epistemic credentials depend on there being a continuous doxastic information-link 
between past and present. 
One consequence is that since beliefs have conceptual contents, the information 
retained in factual memory is always conceptual (even though it may be partly or fully 
indexical). Another consequence is that the content of factual memory need not concern the 
past. The remembered information might have been originally acquired not only through 
perception but also through testimony or reasoning. For instance, I have been told some days 
ago that I have an appointment tomorrow. I have kept track of the days, and today I remember 
that I have an appointment tomorrow, but I am unable to recall the past circumstance in which 
this information was acquired. Or what I have been told is that I will have an appointment on 
9 November 1998, and inferred that it is in three days, then keeping track of the days as 
                                                                 
8 It follows that some, but not necessarily all factual memories depend on meta-representational abilities. 
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before. In one case, what I remember has been acquired directly through testimony; in the 
other case, it has been acquired through reasoning based on testimony and other knowledge. 
 
§3 Reflexivity and childhood amnesia 
 
 Factual memory is purely preservative. Is it true of episodic memory as well? In this 
and the following sections, I shall discuss two conceptions which lead to an affirmative 
answer to this question. As we shall see, both conceptions raise serious problems. 
 On the first conception of episodic memory to be presented, episodic memory is 
purely preservative because it is assimilated to a kind of factual memory. At the end of the 
first section, I envisaged a possible account of episodic memory in terms of a structured set of 
factual memories. The proposal was that an episodic memory is just a factual memory 
associated with the further, meta-representational memory that the former memory comes 
directly from the subject’s past experience. Now this proposal has similarities with the theory 
of episodic memory put forward by Perner in his important book (1991). Suppose for example 
that the subject remembers, in the episodic sense, a particular word on a list he has seen 
before. According to Tulving (1985), the subject has access to an “episodic trace information” 
which Perner (1991: 163) claims is a “metarepresentational comment” on how information 
was obtained: 
 
(4) I have information that “pear” was on the list, and I have this information 
because I have seen “pear” on the list. 
 
 On Perner’s view, an advantage of the meta-comment theory is that it accounts for the 
phenomenon of “childhood amnesia”, namely the fact that adults generally (i.e. statistically) 
have no memories of t he first three or four years of their childhood. The explanation is that 
before that age children do not have the necessary meta-representational abilities, so they 
have difficulties in forming long-term memories of their experiences. 
 There is one interpretation of Perner’s theory which invites the objection raised in §1. 
On this interpretation, we can take (4) as the description of two separate pieces of knowledge 
– “I have information that ‘pear’ was on the list” and “I have this information because I have 
seen ‘pear’ on the list”, the latter involving a representation of the former. The objection is 
that even if the phrase “I have this information because I have seen ‘pear’ on the list” is read 
as meaning that the relevant information (that “pear” was on the list) comes directly from 
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one’s past experience (in the sense already introduced), someone could possess both pieces of 
information and fail to have an episodic memory of seeing the word on the list. 
 However, there is another interpretation of Perner’s theory which escapes this 
objection. Instead of saying that (4) describes two pieces of information, we stipulate that it 
describes a single piece of information which refers to itself. The reflexivity of the memory 
information can be more explicitly indicated as follows: 
  
(5) I have information that (“pear” was on the list and this information comes 
directly from my past experience of the list).9 
 
Reflexivity comes from the deictic term “this information”, which refers to the very 
piece of information it contributes to express. If the information is conceived as a Russellian 
proposition, it contains as an objective constituent the memory state or event which carries it. 
The general idea is the following: when I remember x in the episodic sense, I have a 
collection of factual memories not only about x, but equally and simultaneously about the fact 
that this same collection comes directly from my past experience. Episodic memories are 
reflexive factual memories. Since (arguably) reflexivity entails meta-representation (although 
the converse is not true),10 the proposed account can still be invoked to explain childhood 
amnesia. 
Let us grant that the reflexive account of episodic memory deals with Goethe’s 
Problem: the piece of information described by (5) could have been acquired neither by 
reasoning nor by testimony, at least not while preserving the essential reflexivity. My memory 
provides me with a reason to believe that itself comes directly from my own experience. The 
question is, is this a plausible account of episodic memory? 
Note first that it is essential to Perner’s explanation of childhood amnesia (as it is to 
account for the positive epistemic value of the relevant factual memories) that the retained 
piece of information was acquired at the same time as the remembered experience. If it were 
allowed that it can be acquired later, it would be unclear, in particular, why people are unable 
to recall events from a time of their lives (before the age of 3 or 4) when they lacked the 
capacity to meta-represent. The reflexive account of the distinction between episodic memory 
                                                                 
9 In a later work, Perner (forthcoming) presents something like this refined formulation to avoid the style of 
objection raised here. Perner’s actual formulation is “I have information (that ‘pear’ was on the list and that I 
have this information because I have seen ‘pear’ on the list)”. For similar proposals, cf. Searle (1983) and Owens 
(1996). 
10 For details on this point, cf. my (1997), in which I tried (I now think wrongly) to assimilate episodic memories 
to reflexive factual ones. 
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and (mere) factual memory points to different ways in which the remembered events were 
encoded when they were first experienced by the subject. Something like the view that 
memory is purely preservative is presupposed here. At least, it seems to be required that there 
be a continuous, reflexive information-link between the remembered experience and the 
present memory: episodic memory involves the preservation of a special kind of information 
over time.11 
However, such a view is a source of difficulties for the reflexive account. In particular, 
there is the question of how the piece of reflexive information was acquired in the past. 
Consider the following unwelcome consequence of this account. I can remember a particular 
incident in the episodic sense only if (i) the incident was (consciously) experienced by me, 
and (ii) I had a roughly simultaneous second-order representation of my experience. This does 
not fare well with many relevant cases, in which I suddenly remember something to which I 
barely paid attention when I first perceived it. Suppose I was absent-minded, thinking about 
something else. Surely I saw the book (it was in my visual field), but it is implausible to 
suggest that my visual representation of it was at that time the object of a (reflexive) meta-
representation. 
In a recent paper (forthcoming), Perner expresses some sympathy for a version of the 
“higher-order thought” (HOT) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness of 
a fact requires awareness of the state with which one beholds the fact.12 Perhaps, then, he 
would argue on the following lines. It seems implausible, on phenomenological grounds, that 
every conscious experience is accompanied by a higher-order representation that makes it 
conscious, but it is only because we implicitly assume that the latter is itself conscious. HOT 
theories of consciousness usually reject this assumption. My visual experience of the book 
was conscious because it was the object of a meta-representation which does not itself have to 
be conscious. That is why it does not seem to me that I have a representation of my visual 
experience when I simply see the book. 
However, it is not clear that this strategy is available in the present case. When I 
remember having seen the book, I have a fully conscious piece of information, but it is argued 
that it was unconscious at the time of its acquisition (at least as far as its reflexive component 
is concerned). In the HOT picture, what makes an occurrent mental state conscious is the fact 
                                                                 
11 In Perner (forthcoming), it is said that one has to “encode (or later reconstruct)” (my italics) the meta-
representational comment. Reconstructing cannot mean here acquiring the information expressed by such a 
comment after the remembered experience; otherwise, why should I be unable to reconstruct meta-
representational comments about experiences I had before the age of 3? 
12 Cf. Armstrong (1980), Rosenthal (1993). 
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that it is the object of a meta-representation. By definition, an essentially reflexive thought is 
already its own object; it is at once presentational and meta-representational, so to speak. 
How, then, could the HOT theory allow for it to be unconscious? The point here is not so 
much that reflexive information cannot be retained unconsciously, when the subject does not 
actually use the information but is merely disposed to retrieve it. It is rather that it cannot be 
acquired unconsciously, because of its essentially reflexive structure. The HOT theory of 
consciousness must see with suspicion the very notion of acquiring reflexive information 
unconsciously. 
Moreover, one might wonder how my present memory can give m e a reason to believe 
that I saw a book in the past if it emerged, at some point, from unconscious acquisition of the 
remembered information. For what is the difference, from the subject’s point of view, 
between a memory which becomes conscious and a piece of information, or belief, which 
merely comes to them as something they did not have before? Of course, I might discover that 
I had an unconscious belief, by realizing that I behaved in surprising ways in various past 
situations, but such a discovery is possible only if I have the independent means of 
establishing that my unconscious belief was there for some time. Intuitively, this seems to 
require genuine episodic memory (of my past behaviour), precisely of the kind that, I shall 
argue, the reflexive account cannot invoke.13 
Alternatively, one might claim that there was an appropriate meta-representation at the 
time I saw the book, namely the indexical representation of one’s global perceptual 
experience as that experience, or as being thus. One might conceptualize an experience as 
being thus but not as containing a representation of the book, even if one’s experience 
contained such a representation. The claim is that I suddenly remember the book by 
discovering that that experience has always contained ( inter alia) a representation of it. Even 
if we accept the idea that perceptual experience is always accompanied by a meta-
representation of this kind (which I think we should not), it is doubtful that the indexical 
concept “ that experience” continuously carries a potentially conscious information about the 
book if the latter was completely unattended at the time of the experience. 
To sum up, Perner’s reflexive account faces a dilemma. Either episodic memory is 
purely preservative, or it is not. In the first case, we are bound to postulate meta-
representations formed at the same time as the remembered experiences, but this seems to 
                                                                 
13 This speaks equally to those versions of the HOT theory of consciousness which hold that an unconscious 
meta-representation about a first-order representation is not enough to make the latter conscious; see Carruthers 
(1996). As far I as I can see, Carruthers does not explicitly address here the question of how an unconscious 
piece of information can become conscious. 
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misdescribe the phenomenology of many relevant cases. In the second case, justice is done to 
the phenomenology, but we have lost a possible explanation of childhood amnesia. The 
striking fact that episodic memory emerges at about the same time as the ability to have meta-
representations is left unaccounted. 
 
§4 Episodic memory and non-conceptual information 
 
As we have just seen, episodic memory cannot be assimilated to reflexive factual 
memory. Factual memory is purely preservative, and it is implausible to suppose that 
everything that we can remember in the episodic sense was initiated by a reflexive experience 
or state. Our discussion so far strongly suggests that episodic memory is not a kind of factual 
memory. We should not conclude too hastily, though, that episodic memory is not purely 
preservative. What we have to examine is the conception according to which, just as factual 
memory was described as the preservation of doxastic information, episodic memory can be 
understood in terms of the preservation of a different kind of information – non-doxastic, 
indeed non-conceptual information. 
Consider a proposal that Gareth Evans made en passant, in a footnote. He suggests 
that the distinction between remembering that there was such-and-such a thing and 
remembering that thing, or between remembering that there was such-and-such an episode 
and remembering the episode, “turns on the kind of information retained” (1982: 267, note 1). 
If we read the distinction between factual and episodic memory into this passage, the proposal 
is that factual memory is the retention of conceptual content, whereas episodic memory 
carries non-conceptual information about the past. The distinction between factual and 
episodic memory corresponds to different kinds of content – conceptual in the former case 
and non-conceptual in the second. Both forms of memory are purely preservative, although 
different kinds of i nformation are retained. Does this suggestion provide an adequate solution 
to Goethe’s Problem? 
To begin with, I think that we should exclude the following explanation as a 
satisfactory answer to our problem. Suppose that I have an apparent memory, and reason as 
follows. “This memory has a non-conceptual content, so it has to come directly from my own 
past experience (if it is not illusory). After all, testimony always carries conceptual 
information, embodied in language, and inference always involves conceptual contents. So if 
my memory is veridical, it comes directly from the remembered event.” Such a reasoning 
cannot be what makes the difference, among my present memories, between those that are 
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episodic and those that are not. Episodic memory is non-inferential in the intuitive sense that 
it immediately presents itself as episodic. I do not need to infer its episodic character from 
features of its content. 
Still, one might insist that episodic memory yields a reason to believe that it comes 
directly from one’s own experience precisely in virtue of the fact that it has a special kind of 
content. There are at least two worries with this proposal, though. 
One worry, which I do not want to dwell on here, concerns the sense in which the non-
conceptual information carried by episodic memory can immediately ground past-tense 
judgements. Evans (1982: 239) says that when the subject has (what we call) an episodic 
memory, he is in a “non-conceptual informational state” which puts him in a position to 
judge, being immune to error through misidentification, “I was facing a burning tree”.14 This 
non-conceptual informational state differs from that which is involved in perception, and 
which allows us to judge, being equally immune to error through misidentification, “I am 
facing a burning tree”. Both states carry non-conceptual information, but the difference lies 
precisely in the reference to the past: “If the subject is in the memory state, it seems to him 
that such-and-such was the case”. The difficulty, which Evans himself notes, is to understand 
how there can be such non-conceptual states which are in some sense about the past. The 
worry is especially pressing if we think that only conceptual states, whose contents are wholly 
expressible in language, can carry past-tense information, at least if that information is about a 
particular, non-repeatable past event, as opposed to being merely about temporal phases (cf. 
Campbell, 1994: ch. 2). 
 Another worry arises even if the notion of non-conceptual information about the past 
is shown to be intelligible. Evans’s proposal raises Goethe’s Problem again: How are we to 
exclude the possibility that such information, which I possess in the present, derives indirectly 
from my past experience? Suppose, for instance, that at some time in the past I was shown 
photographs and films of an incident in which I was involved before that time, but had 
completely forgotten. Testimony by films and photographs surely carries non-conceptual 
information in some sense. It is not impossible, then, that non-conceptual information about 
the incident has been retained in the present, which I can express with “I remember that fight; 
it was pitiful”. The point is that my present memory may not be episodic: I may still wonder 
                                                                 
14 The notion of immunity to error through misidentification comes from Shoemaker (1968). What it means in 
this context is that my memory cannot ground knowledge of the fact that someone was facing a burning tree 
without at the same time grounding knowledge that I was facing a burning tree. There is no possibility for me to 
make a mistake as to the identity of the person whose experience I am remembering. On this aspect of memory, 
cf. also Wiggins (1993). 
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whether the information preserved in the present memory has been relayed by external 
testimony, especially if I do not remember that I was shown films and photographs. This 
hypothesis, as well as the hypothesis that the information-link is direct (in the sense that it 
does not involve t estimony or reasoning), are equally compatible with the veridicality of my 
memory. Therefore, the mere fact that my memory involves the past-tense demonstrative 
concept “that fight”, based on non-conceptual information about the past, does not make it 
episodic – in the story just told, it is a factual memory. 
 I do not wish to dispute the fact that there are many contexts in which understanding 
past-tense demonstratives requires having relevant episodic memories. Evans gives the 
following example: S prompts A to remember a particular bird they saw together on a hunting 
trip. S asks “Do you remember that bird we saw years ago?”. Eventually, A has the right 
memory: “Oh yes! Now I remember. You mean that bird” (1982: 308). Clearly, in that kind of 
context, the understanding of “that bird”, as used by S, requires an appropriate episodic 
memory from A. It does not follow that such uses of past-tense demonstratives must be 
invoked in an explanation of what is special about episodic memory as opposed to mere 
factual memory. On the contrary, we need an independent notion of episodic memory to 
understand the intelligibility of the dialogue.15 
In order for Evans’s proposal to work, it must be shown that the information carried by 
episodic memory is of a kind which cannot be transmitted by testimony, in particular 
testimony aided by pictures and (physical) images. It is plausible to suggest that as far as 
memory is concerned, there is no such information at the personal level. At that level, any 
information carried by episodic memory could in principle be carried by testimony or 
reasoning.16 There is no need to invoke non-conceptual contents to account for episodic 
memory; even if there are such contents, in memory they are always backed up by suitably 
indexical conceptual c ontents. It is important to note that this is not an objection to Evans’s 
notion of an information-link. His notion is different from the one used here, since it is 
specifically introduced to capture the (anti-intellectualist) insight that there is a non-
conceptual informational system which constitutes “the substratum of our cognitive lives” 
(1982: 122). We might sympathize with the insight, but claim that Evans’s notion of an 
information-link is not the key to understanding the distinction between episodic and factual 
memory. Indeed, a main claim of the present chapter will be that a theory of memory should 
                                                                 
15 For more on memory demonstratives, cf. Campbell, Ch. 6, this volume. 
16 This is true even for reflexive information, although in that case, the content of episodic memory could not 
have been taken from testimony or reasoning (cf. Section 3). 
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recognize at most two central kinds of link between past and present: doxastic information-
links at the personal level, and neuropsychological causal links at the subpersonal level, 
whose nature is to be investigated empirically. Non-conceptual information-links at the 
personal level need not enter the picture. 
 
§5 Preservation, acquisition and re-acquisition of information 
 
 As we have seen, Goethe’s Problem creates difficulties for the view that episodic 
memory involves, at the personal level, the continuous retention of information acquired by 
other cognitive means. These difficulties encourage us to explore a different avenue, 
according to which episodic memory is not in general purely preservative; its epistemic 
credentials do not depend on there being a personal-level information-link between present 
and past. 
 The phenomenological facts are at least compatible with the claim that episodic 
memory is not purely preservative. Consider the phenomenon of suddenly remembering 
something that is re-considered for the first time since the original perception. When we have 
such an experience, we have the feeling that we acquire an original memory, which we did 
not have just before. This is very different from the experience of recalling something which 
we had momentarily forgotten. In the latter case, there is a sense in which the memory was 
there, only we could not access it. In contrast, when we suddenly realize that there was a book 
on the table, to which we barely paid attention, we do not actualize a memory which was 
already “there” in the same dispositional sense (at the same level of potentiality). 
 From an epistemological point of view, the rejection of the view that episodic memory 
is purely preservative means that we have to take seriously the possibility that episodic 
memory is a “stopping point” in the process of justification (cf. Dummett, 1973: 619). Pace 
Ryle (1949: ch. 8), it is often perfectly al l right to declare “I remember it” as an answer to a 
challenge as to how I know something. Of course, when my answer is intended to express an 
episodic memory, it presupposes that I previously witnessed something (in the typical case). It 
does not follow, though, that the information I now possess is just old evidence. On the 
contrary, it is fresh evidence in the sense that I did not possess that information just before my 
sudden awareness. My memory has enabled me to re-acquire it. 
 I suggest that episodic memory is a stopping point in the process of justification 
because it is a genuine source of knowledge and information. We might say that it is 
analogous to a form of acquaintance like perception. However, surface grammar 
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notwithstanding, episodic memory cannot be just acquaintance of things. It is true that we 
tend to report episodic memory using phrases of the form “I remember x” rather than of the 
form “I remember that p” (although there are exceptions).17 Episodic memory, though, must 
be capable of grounding knowledge about what happened at a particular time, which requires 
that a concept of a particular time and a concept of what happens then be articulated together. 
When I have an episodic memory of Pierre, Pierre cannot be the sole object of my conscious 
awareness. Otherwise, “I remember Pierre” would have the same force as “I can recognize 
Pierre”, which involves no reference to a particular past time. What I am conscious of is 
meeting Pierre two days ago. In general, the proper object of episodic memory seems to be an 
event rather than a thing. 
 There is a significant difference between perception and episodic memory which 
suggests that the matter is more complicated. This difference concerns the cognitive dynamics 
of the two faculties. Perception essentially involves the capacity to keep track of things and 
events in the various states, phases and relations in which they present themselves to the 
perceiver at different times. For instance, I can compensate for the perceived thing’s 
movement by adjusting my relative position to it. In contrast, memory need not be 
contemporaneous with a capacity to keep track of the remembered events in this sense. I can 
remember the flight of a particular bird long after I have perceptually lost track of it. What I 
keep track of in memory is at best facts and not events, but here the notion of “keeping track” 
has a different sense. There is no need to compensate for spatio-temporal changes in the 
remembered facts, for a fact has neither a spatial nor a temporal location; it is immutable. This 
does not mean that the maintenance of a memory over time is automatic. When an occurrent 
episodic memory is formed for the first time, it can persist after that as a dispositional state. 
At this point, we might recognize active requirements on grasping the same content over time 
and maintaining a state of memory knowledge. The description of what it means to grasp the 
same content over time and to possess persisting knowledge is a task for the theory of 
concepts and epistemology. 
 Episodic memory, then, is present awareness of facts which is not grounded on present 
awareness of events, although it is typically grounded on previous awareness of the 
remembered events. In this sense, my episodic memory of meeting Pierre is a case of direct 
knowledge of a fact involving an event – meeting Pierre – while I am not at present 
acquainted with that event (I might have lost track of it). It is analogous, in this respect, to 
                                                                 
17 For instance, I can say that I remember Pythagoras’ theorem, but what I mean, of course, is that I have a set of 
factual memories corresponding to the various propositions which constitute the theorem. 
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introspective self-knowledge according to Shoemaker, that is a case of knowledge of a fact 
about oneself which does not simultaneously involve acquaintance with the self.18 
 It might seem that Goethe’s Problem is immediately solved by the concession that 
episodic memory is not purely preservative, but is a form of acquaintance with remembered 
facts. My having a particular episodic memory is a sui generis experience, and if I have no 
reason to doubt that it is veridical, it is misleading to ask how I know that the remembered 
piece of information comes directly from my own past life. I am directly “en rapport” with a 
fact concerning my own past, apparently without the help of reasoning or external testimony. 
For instance, if I suddenly remember that there was a (previously unattended) book on the 
table, I know that I am in possession of a piece of information which I did not have just 
before. The logical form of my memory is the following:19 
 
(6) I have a memory experience which carries the information that there was a 
book on the table. 
 
 However, one grossly misrepresents the true nature of episodic memory if one takes 
(6) as a complete description of the content of my memory experience. At best, (6) would 
fully describe a very different cognitive faculty, perhaps clairvoyance (assuming that the 
notion of clairvoyance makes sense). Unlike clairvoyance, episodic memory carries, and 
presents itself as carrying, information which the subject already possessed once. As 
Campbell (1994: 233) puts it, episodic memory (like factual memory) is stepwise: it depends 
on there being other ways of finding out how things are. More precisely, when there is no 
continuous information-link at the personal level, it is the re-acquisition of a piece of 
information acquired in the past, that is the faculty of reproducing in the present a past 
informational state. The following description is slightly better as far as this distinctive feature 
of episodic memory is concerned:  
 
(7) I have a memory experience which carries the information that there was a 
book on the table, and this piece of information presents itself as something I 
acquired in a previous experience. 
                                                                 
18 The crucial difference is of course that (in Shoemaker’s theory) the self is never experienced as a thing. Cf. 
Shoemaker (1996 : essay 10), where the distinction between awareness of facts and awareness of objects (things 
or events) is discussed. 
19 In this and the next formulations, the phrases “a book” and “the table” should be read, more realistically, as 
complex demonstratives: “this book” and “that table”.  
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However, (7) is still incomplete, for it does not entail that I have an episodic memory 
of the book. Suppose that I was perceptually aware that there was a book on the table. Later, 
when I have definitely forgotten this fact, someone tells me that I really did perceive the book. 
Description (7) might correctly refer to a still later experience in which I re-acquire the 
information that there was a book on the table and this information presents itself as 
something I have witnessed in the past. Still, I do not have a genuine episodic memory of the 
book, since past testimony is among the conditions that make my present memory experience 
possible (although I may not know it). In this particular example, I can have the experience 
described by (7) only if there is previous testimony – without it, I would be totally unable to 
gain the memory that there was a book on the table.20 
Of course, this is just Goethe’s Problem in a different guise. It shows that the content 
of an ordinary episodic memory must be more complex than (7) suggests. In particular, it 
should not be compatible with being completely unable to re-acquire the relevant information 
between the past experience and the actual, present memory. I would like to claim that when I 
remember something in the episodic sense, I have a piece of information which presents itself 
as being directly re-acquired from my past experience, in a way which excludes the essential 
intervention of reasoning or testimony. Thus (8) might be the correct description of (a central 
case of) episodic memory:  
 
(8) I have a memory experience which carries the information that there was a 
book on the table, and this piece of information presents itself as being directly 
re-acquired from my past experience. 
 
If we adopt this description of episodic memory, Goethe’s Problem is dealt with in a 
very special way. Episodic memory is the experience of re-acquiring a piece of information as 
something which is taken directly from the past experience itself, without the essential 
mediation of reasoning or testimony. More generally, episodic memory gives me a reason to 
believe that it comes directly from my own past experience because the fact that it does so is 
presented in the memory experience itself. However, the notion of “coming directly from 
                                                                 
20 Similar points apply to Locke’s and William James’ theories of memory. For Locke, memory is the capacity 
of the mind “to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it 
has had them before” (Locke, 1997: 148). For James, “memory proper […] is the knowledge of an event, or fact 
[…] with the additional consciousness that we have […] experienced it before” (1890: 648). If I am right, these 
are crucially incomplete descriptions of episodic memory. 
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one’s own past experience” is interpreted here in a crucially different way than in the accounts 
presented above in Sections 3 and 4. There is no suggestion that the meta-representational 
information carried by memory is preserved at the personal level from the time of the past 
experience to the present; very often, my episodic memory won’t involve a continuous 
information-link from past to present. Of course, there must be some subpersonal link 
between the past experience and the present memory, but this link is not supposed to ground, 
at the personal level, an episodic memory at each time between past and present. At best, the 
link must guarantee that the relevant memory can be gained. 
It is worth comparing the present account with proposals made by two authors from 
quite different philosophical horizons. Merleau-Ponty, just after having stressed the non-
inferential character of genuine memory (“memory that reaches to the past”), writes about his 
memory of when he ordered a particular English cloth: 
  
When […] I find again the concrete origin of the memory, it is because it is replaced in 
a particular stream of fear and hope which goes from Munich to the war; it is because I 
go back to the lost time; and it is because, from the considered moment to my present, 
the chain of retentions and the successive overlapping horizons ensure a continuous 
path (1945: translated from p. 478). 
 
 What Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest is that a genuine memory must enable one to 
“see through the past” to the remembered experience. He would probably agree that in cases 
in which the remembered information is essentially relayed by testimony or reasoning, there 
is no continuous path (once again, at the personal level) leading to the original experience. 
There is precisely no path of this kind in the example discussed above, when (7) was rejected 
as a non-perspicuous account of episodic memory. 
 Some years earlier (in 1927), G. F. Stout proposed a similar account. He draws a 
distinction between reminiscence, that is what we call here “episodic memory”, and 
retentiveness, which concerns in general the persistence in the present of the results of past 
mental processes. He writes: 
 
In remembering past experience as such we are cognisant of it as past relatively to our 
own actual present in the moment of remembering it. Our total object is a complex 
unity which includes present and past in relation to each other. We are aware of the 
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actual present as continued back into a certain past s pecially connected with it; and of 
this past as prolonged forward to the present (1930: 175). 
 
 I have no objection to this account of episodic memory, except perhaps as far as the 
notion of retentiveness is concerned. Stout says that retentiveness is an indispensable 
condition of reminiscence. If “retentiveness” means that there is a continuous causal link, 
possibly at the subpersonal level, between past experience and present memory, he is surely 
right. If, on the other hand, he means that there must be an information-link between past and 
present at the personal level, I disagree. As I said before, the phenomenon of suddenly 
remembering something seems to indicate that episodic memory involves the re-acquisition of 
a piece of information which has not been preserved by the subject, whether doxastically or 
otherwise. 
 Note that the claim that episodic memory presents a piece of information as something 
which is directly connected to one’s past experience does not entail that the subject is always 
in a position to keep track of the time or date of the original experience. The subject might 
have the strong feeling that he recently saw the book he is now looking for, without being 
able to remember exactly when. Indeed, he might remember two past experiences as being 
connected to the present and be unable to recover from his memory the temporal relations 
between the experiences, or their relative order.21 What is important is that at least some 
episodic memories provide more precise temporal information about the remembered events, 
and that in general the subject can legitimately impose on his memory a conception of time as 
linear (cf. Campbell, 1997). 
 Finally, the present analysis of episodic memory can account for the following 
situation. I have a visual experience of seeing a book which is a complete hallucination, 
although I do not know it. Later, I have a memory experience of seeing the book which is not 
veridical, and I may know it, if I realized in between that my past visual experience was an 
hallucination. How is it possible, then, to remember my past hallucination itself? I suggest 
that whereas my past experience was a hallucination, my present memory is only an illusion. 
Here I mean something like Austin’s (1962) notion of an illusion, according to which an 
experience is illusory if something is perceived as having the wrong properties. Similarly, 
there is something veridical in my present memory experience: I am not presented with the 
fact that there was a book on the table (for there was no such fact), but I am presented with the 
                                                                 
21 The matter is different if the content of memory includes specific indexical concepts like “yesterday” or “the 
day before yesterday”. 
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fact that a piece of information (which is in fact misinformation) comes directly from my past 
experience. Thus I can remember the past experience itself even though it did not warrant the 
information that there was a book on the table. 
 
§6 Conclusion 
 
 In this essay, I have explored an intermediary position between two antagonist 
conceptions of memory: on the one hand, a conception of memory as a mere form of 
knowledge, involving possession of information preserved over time (the “purely 
preservative” view of memory), and on the other hand, a conception of memory as a genuine 
source of knowledge and information, possibly acquired for the first time. There is an intimate 
connection, then, between memories being purely preservative and them being not episodic. 
The mental state which I am in when I have a factual memory is much like the one I was in 
before, whereas the fact that my episodic memory has been caused in a certain way has made 
a difference to what kind of mental state it i s (and not only to what kind of content it has). I do 
not want to exclude a priori the possibility of reflexive factual memories, whose causal 
history is somehow written into their contents, but we have to realize that the range of 
episodic memory is in a sense much wider. In particular, I can have an episodic memory of a 
past scene even though there is no information-link at the personal level (let alone a reflexive 
information-link) connecting past and present. 
 Episodic memory requires meta-representational abilities, since its content describes 
or refers to a previous experience, and is essentially reflexive. The core information carried 
by this form of memory need not be reflexive, though. It is the information originally acquired 
by the subject, typically through perception. So how should we explain the striking fact that 
we have episodic memories only of events experienced at times when the meta-
representational abilities are in place? As the Editors remind me, the theory that there is a 
necessary connection between childhood amnesia and the development of meta-
representational abilities is actually quite controversial, and the fact that our first memories 
come on the scene at roughly the same time as these abilities might be a mere coincidence. 
Still, I shall end this chapter with a brief and speculative remark about why I think the 
conception of episodic memory sketched here is not utterly incompatible with there being a 
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connection between episodic memory and the emergence of meta-representational abilities, 
wherever the truth lies with this particular issue.22 
As we saw, there is a sense in which (episodic) memory is a kind of “vision” through 
our past life to the remembered experience. Now perhaps such a “vision” is possible only if 
the subject is at least capable of self-consciousness at any time between the remembered 
experience and the present. How can we “see” through our past life if it consists in a mere 
succession of first-order mental states and episodes, neither unified nor bound together by any 
reflection? In this perspective, episodic memory requires a present exercise of self-
consciousness, but it also requires that the capacity of self-consciousness be in place from the 
remembered experience to the present. Since such a capacity appears to e merge at around the 
age of 3 or 4, the phenomenon of childhood amnesia would be explained by the presence of a 
“block”, at about that time, beyond which episodic memory is simply blind. Of course, this is 
merely a speculation, and further work on the role of self-consciousness in episodic memory 
is called for. 
 
                                                                 
22 For further reflection on the relationship between self-consciousness and episodic memory development, cf. 
McCormack and Hoerl (forthcoming). 
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